This note provides three additional results that are omitted from Hirata and Kasuya (2017) but were contained in an older version (Hirata and Kasuya, 2015) .
This note provides three additional results that are omitted from Hirata and Kasuya (2017) but were contained in an older version (Hirata and Kasuya, 2015) . All the notation and definitions follow Hirata and Kasuya (2017) . First, Theorem 1 of Hirata and Kasuya (2017) , together with the results by Kominers and Sönmez (2016) , immediately entails the following.
Definition 3. Given a number of slots q h ∈ N, a collection ( h,s ) 1≤s≤q h of linear orders, called slot-specific priorities, over {x ∈ X : h (x) = h} ∪ {∅} induces a choice function for hospital h as follows: For each X ⊂ X, C h (X ) = {x 1 , . . . , x q h } − {∅}, where x s is recursively defined by letting Proof. In the case of slot-specific priorities, Kominers and Sönmez (2016) show that the rule induced by the cumulative offer process is both stable and strategy-proof. The uniqueness follows from our Theorem 1.
Second, along with Theorem 5 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010) , Theorem 2 of Hirata and Kasuya (2017) leads to the following corollary. Definition 4. Hospital h's choice function C h (·) satisfies the unilateral substitutes condition if there do not exist contracts x, y ∈ X and a subset X ⊂ X of contracts such that Proof. Under the supposition, a doctor-optimal stable allocation always exists and is induced by the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Hatfield and Kojima, 2010, Theorem 5) . 3 Hence, the claim immediately follows from our Theorem 2.
Lastly, we present a variant of Theorem 3 of Hirata and Kasuya (2017) , which establish the second-best optimality of the doctor-optimal stable rule no matter whether it is strategy-proof or not, given its existence.
Theorem 8. Suppose that every hospital h ∈ H has a choice function C h (·) satisfying the IRC condition. Then, no individually rational and strategy-proof rule strictly dominates the doctoroptimal stable rule (whether strategy-proof or not).
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that f (·) is individually rational and strategyproof, the doctor-optimal stable rule X * (·) is well-defined, and that f (·) strictly dominates X * (·). As in the proofs of Theorems 1-3, let * D ∈ P be a preference profile such that
Then, for the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3, it follows from the stability of
On the one hand, the strategy-proofness of f (·) implies
On the other hand, x (d * , X * ( * * D )) = ∅ must also hold by doctor-optimality. 4 These together imply f ( * * D ) = X * ( * * D ), which contradicts the definition of * D , and the proof is complete.
